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**Report of
International Game '96**



By David C. Hayes

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13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)
This memorandum reports the results of the third annual International Game held at the Naval War College. The game brings together diplomats, journalists and academics in mock United Nations Security Council to deal with emerging crises in the 2005 time frame. International Game '96 examined two scenarios. The first, a dispute over resources in the South China Sea, examined the challenges of dealing with a crisis in which a major power, China, is involved. The second crisis focused on unrest in northern Africa, particularly in Algeria. The report provides an overview of the game as well as insights garnered from the participants.

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INTERNATIONAL GAME '96

by

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INTRODUCTION

In order to introduce a broader perspective into games and simulations conducted at the Naval War College (and specifically into the Global Game series), it was decided in 1994 to sponsor a game (International Game '94)¹ involving academics, diplomats, practitioners and journalists from around the world. The success of that endeavor led to the decision to make the International Game an annual event.² Like its predecessors, the objective of International Game '96 was to garner participants' reaction to emerging crises presented in illustrative scenarios. The focus was on how international perspectives might affect US policies and responses. Participants were encouraged to speak freely and were assured that their comments would not be construed to reflect official sanction by any organization or government.

The forum for soliciting inputs was a simulated United Nations Security Council. This format is used in the International Game series for a number of reasons, foremost of which is the fact that no other venue provides a broad enough international foundation upon which to build. Participants from all five of the Permanent Member States were invited along with players from 16 other nations. A representative from the UN Secretariat was among those players. For game purposes, it was assumed that the Security Council had been expanded to twenty-one members and that four additional states (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan) also had permanent seats but no veto.

International Game '96 organizers selected two crises on which to concentrate. The first was an Algerian scenario; the other involved rising tensions in the South China Sea over the exploitation of resources in the Spratly Islands chain. The sole purpose of the scenarios was to set the stage for discussions by placing participants in situations where they would have to decide how to sustain or restore international peace and security. This synthetic, but necessary, construct was intended to be neither prescriptive nor predictive; rather, it forced players to consider common as well as idiosyncratic aspects of each scenario.

The game provided two distinct but important types of insights. One was into the differing but often overlapping *national* and *regional* views of the players; the other was in the degrees to which those views could (or could not) be melded in order to arrive at broader *international* solutions to problems of peace and security. The haggling which took place in the game's marketplace of ideas provided as much grist for analysis as the recommended resolutions players proposed. Understanding why they reacted as they did and what factors contributed to or limited compromise were key concerns.

¹ See Stanley E. Spangler, *Report of the Lateral International Global Game '94*, Strategic Research Department Report 6-94 (Newport: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1994).

² See Bradd C. Hayes, *Report of International Game '95*, Strategic Research Memorandum 8-95 (Newport: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 1995).

The first day was devoted to world and regional overviews as well as presentation of the scenarios. Days two through four were dedicated to scenario play, and day five to an executive briefing.

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL OVERVIEWS

The week began with a quick *tour d'horizon* of the world in 2006 by Dr. John Gannon. The future he described involved no "great power" threats requiring the establishment of counterbalancing global coalitions. Specifically, he asserted a new East-West confrontation with Russia, reminiscent of the Cold War, would not emerge during the time frame being considered. He averred that domestic economic challenges will drive nations to seek multilateral solutions to international problems. He asserted that the military option for dealing with crises will remain the last alternative to be tried by the global community and that even the United States, the only remaining military superpower, will be reluctant to use it.

Dr. Gannon predicted that technology will continue to change the way individuals, organizations and nations deal with one another. Interactive communications, via desktop teleconferencing for example, and increased access to the internet will make it more difficult (probably impossible) for governments to control the types of information available to their populations. In fact, technology will advance so rapidly that governments, institutions, and individuals will become increasingly unable to control the magnitude of the change.

He said Europe will remain a major economic center even though Asia's market share will grow. South America will also increase in economic importance. China's influence (economically and militarily) will also rise, not just in Asia but worldwide. In South and Southwest Asia, the influence of India and Iran will continue to grow. Finally, he believed that many of today's problems will still be around ten years from now (e.g., northern Africa, the Balkans, India-Pakistan, and maybe even Korea).

In response to Dr. Gannon's overview, players openly wondered what the relationships between Russia, China and Japan might be in 2006. Dr. Gannon responded that no one can state authoritatively what those relationships might be, but he doubted that they would form any permanent coalitions. Their dealings will likely vary from cooperation to confrontation depending on the issue involved.

Participants inquired how poverty, the gap between the *haves* and the *have-nots*, and human rights concerns will affect the world's security environment. Dr. Gannon painted a rather gloomy future in which poverty continues to spread and the gap between the rich and poor continues to increase. He also stated that information technology will exacerbate these problems since access to such technology will constitute a powerful advantage for those who can afford it.

The world overview was followed by regional briefings which dealt more specifically with the areas involved in the game's scenarios: Asia and the Middle East/North Africa. Mr. Marty Petersen presented the Asian overview and offered it from a distinct US perspective. He claimed that Asia in 2006 will be shaped by eight realities:

- 1- East Asia will largely shape the health of the US economy.
- 2- Asia will be more difficult to influence and the US's image there will be less positive.
- 3- Asia will seek to change its global economic clout into global political clout.
- 4- Asia will be more confident and less likely to follow the lead of others.
- 5- Asian security relations will change, with US military presence increasingly questioned.
- 6- China will be a power early in the next century and will maintain an ambivalent relationship with the US.
- 7- China's military resurgence, coupled with regional doubts about the US's long-term commitment to the area, will cause Asian states to increase their military capabilities. Some may start thinking about obtaining weapons of mass destruction.
- 8- Asian leaders will still desire a robust US presence and will look for ways to keep it engaged.

In short, East Asia will become much more powerful at the expense of other regions, but the US will still have a role to play.

Mr. Petersen's first "reality" was questioned by those who believe US economic health will rely as much on traditional European and American markets as it will on Asia. Others wondered whether or not China's transfer of weapons and technology will dramatically affect Sino-US relations. The issue of Korean unification was broached as was the issue of Taiwanese independence. Although Mr. Petersen assumed a unified Korea was a distinct possibility, he acknowledged that the timing of such unification remains a question. On the matter of Taiwan, he was less sanguine and believed that Taiwan would not gain widespread recognition as an independent state.

Mr. Randy Elliott concluded the overviews by providing his thoughts on the Middle East and northern Africa. He pointed out that oil was not the only area resource that could result in confrontation. In fact, water may become even more important. Fresh water aquifers are already being seriously depleted and salt water encroachment has begun. Many states may actually have to import water. For a number of reasons, including the region's explosive population growth, many will also become net importers of food. In order to afford these imports, it is likely that a Mideast cartel will become much more active in controlling the price of oil.

He also noted that there is going to be a large number of leadership changes in the region during the next ten years. So many, in fact, that the result may appear revolutionary. Some states may no longer exist as we know them today if they break down into smaller ethnic nations.

There was some discussion concerning the future of the Middle East peace process in light of the results of the June 1996 Israeli elections and the fact that there will probably be a leadership change in Syria within the next decade. It was posited that there is no reason to view either event as necessarily derailing the peace process—neither is there reason to believe that peace is inevitable. Given that there will be dramatic changes within the region, some discussion was held about emerging alliances, with particular attention given to where Turkey might fit in. The conclusion was that Turkey will strive to maintain its position as a “crossroads nation” between Asia and Europe and will avoid any entanglements which could damage that objective. A Turkish-Iraqi alliance was considered very unlikely, although an Iraqi-Syrian alliance was not ruled out. This possibility would be enhanced if Saudi Arabia emerged as the dominant military state in the region.

The first day concluded with participants receiving and discussing the scenarios they would play throughout the week (see Appendix B). Prebriefing the scenarios allowed game controllers to deal with player objections which could have resulted in their “fighting the scenario” rather than playing the game.

GAME PLAY

Although to some extent the game dealt with the scenarios simultaneously, this report will discuss them sequentially. Both scenarios started out as situations which raised international concern but did not necessarily call for immediate vigorous action. As a result, the resolutions eventually adopted reiterated international concern and proclaimed support for recognized principles of international law. Both scenarios were then escalated, forcing players to consider more urgent and aggressive action to control the crises. The following discussions start with the players reaction to the initial crisis followed by their response to subsequent deteriorating events.

The first crisis tackled by participants was the one facing Algeria and its neighbors. After being briefed on the background and current situation, and having been given an opportunity to put forward their positions, players adjourned to collaborate and draft resolutions. They were free to deliberate with whomever they pleased, but the resulting groupings were not surprising. In the beginning, players dispersed into geographical groups (Asians, US/Europeans, Latin Americans, Africans, and Arabs). For a number of reasons, these coalitions proved unsatisfactory. Japan wanted to collaborate with other economic powers and soon joined the US/European group, which for ease of reference will be labeled the western caucus in this report. Russia originally joined the western caucus but was increasingly drawn into the extended non-aligned group

formed by Africans, Asians and Latin Americans.³ Finally, the Arabs formed a third caucus (with Ghana shifting between the extended non-aligned and Arab groups).⁴ Just as with Russia, members of the Arab caucus often united with the non-aligned group.

The Algerian Crisis

The Algerian crisis followed an election in 2005 during which the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) wrested power from the National Liberation Front (FLN). Surprised by this outcome and unwilling to give up power, FLN leadership deployed the military to suppress opposition and riots. The military was sharply divided over this action and many officers and soldiers supported the popularly-elected FIS which eventually assumed control of the government. However, the resulting chaos and conflict dislodged tens of thousands of refugees and created enormous problems for Algeria's neighbors. Morocco and Tunisia, seeking assistance, brought the matter before the Security Council.

The Arab caucus played a major role during this scenario. Despite the fact that it had attempted to work out a resolution with the western caucus (and wanted to do the same with the non-aligned group), three separate resolutions emerged when time constraints forced the entire group back into plenary session. When it was realized that a few more minutes of consultation might result in a consensus resolution, the plenary took a short adjournment. When the group reconvened, a consensus resolution was in fact presented and unanimously passed without discussion. The resolution dealt primarily with the humanitarian aspects of the crisis (i.e., delivery of assistance to refugees). It also requested the Secretary-General to send a Special Envoy to the area to report on the situation and attempt to mediate a solution.

In an afternoon discussion during which players were asked to explain their reasons for supporting the resolution, numerous participants noted that they had voted for a weak resolution because they were sympathetic to the fact that the government of Algeria was a legitimately-elected government struggling to wrest control from usurpers. Other reasons for supporting the resolution which emerged included:

- There was an immediate requirement to take care of humanitarian needs.
- It was too early to consider a peacekeeping force (i.e., Algeria had received neither an international ultimatum nor enough time to take care of the problem itself).
- Pacific methods to resolve the crisis had not yet been exhausted.

³ This name was selected by the players themselves. It was chosen because many of the states in this caucus had been members of the non-aligned movement. Nevertheless, it was a name with which few were satisfied, they recognized that bloc alignments no longer existed and that being "non-aligned" had no clear meaning.

⁴ The western caucus included the United States, United Kingdom, France, Finland, Japan, Russia, Germany, and Italy. Conferees in the extended non-aligned caucus included India, Brazil, Cameroon, Philippines, Colombia, Ghana, Zimbabwe, China, South Korea and Chile. The final grouping was the Arab caucus consisting of Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco.

- A more assertive (i.e., condemning) resolution could have exacerbated rather than improved the situation.
- Players from the Middle East, in particular, were concerned about the reaction of domestic public opinion should they act in concert with the west against an Arab/Islamic state.

When players were again asked to turn to the Algeria crisis, it had advanced several weeks in “game time” and the situation that greeted them was considerably worse than the one on which they had last been briefed. Increased numbers of refugees were on the move, including in small flotillas heading across the Mediterranean. Conditions in refugee camps had deteriorated and were causing unrest among their populations. Algeria had conducted air raids on and moved forces into position for crossborder attacks against the camps claiming they had become bases for guerrilla activity. Neighboring states countered by moving military forces along Algeria’s borders.

Discussions were generally divided between the western and non-aligned caucuses, with each group submitting a draft resolution. The differences between these two drafts were reconciled during the final plenary session of the game. The resolution called on all parties to cease fighting, established an exclusion zone for heavy armor and fixed-wing aircraft, and authorized deployment of a UN force along the borders between Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. The force was to be a lightly-armed observer group whose primary mission was to protect, disarm, and repatriate refugees. The resolution also included language stressing the importance of national sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs.

The most heated debate over the resolution concerned authorizing the deployment of forces into the region. If forces were to be authorized (but not supplied by either the Organization of African Unity or Arab League), the extended non-aligned group clearly wanted them limited to traditional peacekeeping units under UN-control. The west argued for a more robust international force. Two resolutions were thus put forward for vote, one authorizing an international force (which was not adopted) and one authorizing a UN-controlled force which was eventually adopted.

South China Sea Crisis

This crisis materialized when China decided that its phenomenal economic growth could only be sustained by securing a stable domestic source of oil. Its inland search for oil had faltered badly and confirmation that the Spratly archipelago sat atop the world’s second largest oil reserves convinced China that it was time to act on its claims in that area. It enlisted foreign oil companies to provide capital and equipment in a joint exploration venture and deployed military forces into the area to protect their interests. Fearing China was about to usurp its claims and

restrict both exploitation of resources and free movement of maritime traffic, the Philippines requested the Security Council to get involved in the situation.

Following the presentation of the scenario (see Appendix B), participants voiced concern about Chinese actions and expressed their desire for a peaceful resolution of the situation. This desire proved to be the primary driver during caucus deliberations. Delegates worked hard once again to draft a consensus resolution which could be passed unanimously when the Council reconvened. The resolution stressed the importance of international principles (such as, freedom of navigation), recognized that legitimate competing claims existed in the region over both territory and resources, and called upon all parties to resolve their disputes peacefully.

Although the resolution was adopted unanimously, several states took advantage of the Security Council President's offer to explain their vote. China insisted that it still believed the issue was a regional one (subject only to bilateral negotiations) and that the United Nations was an inappropriate forum for dealing with the crisis. Having said that, the Chinese delegate explained he voted in favor of the resolution because China wanted a peaceful settlement of the situation and did not want to be isolated. The Filipino representative, who had originally desired a much stronger resolution, said she voted in favor of the resolution because its adoption was tantamount to China's recognition that the problem was an international one and that UN involvement was acceptable (a view China later rejected). The United Kingdom player, supported by the United States representative, said that he supported the resolution because he interpreted the resolution's phrase "to refrain from the use of force" to mean that the parties were committed to withdraw forces in the area and the phrase "to refrain from actions that might increase tensions" to mean that continued exploitation of oil resources without an international agreement would cease (views which China once against rejected).

Others elaborated that their support was primarily driven by the desire to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. Players demonstrated genuine concern that their actions could isolate, if not antagonize, a major power like China. The Japanese representative said that his country was particularly sensitive to matters regarding China. The Russian envoy declared that he would have abstained from voting for the resolution had it been worded more strongly. He also noted that the absence of Cold War rhetoric permitted much more reasoned discussion and cooperation than would have otherwise been possible. The US ambassador, supported by most others, stated that her primary goal had been to get a resolution that was satisfactory to both the Asian group and China. States from outside the region were not ready to press for a more radical solution than the Asians were willing to accept even though some believed that a stronger stance by the UN was appropriate.

The representative from Cameroon explained that she supported the resolution because her country confronts a similar territorial challenge and her objective was to protect the rights of smaller states by keeping the international community involved in such issues. In response to a comment from the Egyptian ambassador that he had sought the softest possible statement in

order to avoid offending China, the UK delegate said that his reaction was just the opposite. Had China taken a tougher stance, he would have insisted on stronger language. He also registered his surprise over the extent of compromise ASEAN nations were willing to make. Japan said this was because most ASEAN members do not believe that isolating China is in their best interests.

Participants were informed that their efforts had been unsuccessful and that during a Chinese and Vietnamese confrontation in the Spratlys, shots were fired and a Vietnamese ship sunk. Vietnam countered by placing anti-ship missiles on several islands. As tensions increased, China issued an ultimatum to Vietnam and several more incidents transpired, including merchant ships being denied passage through a Chinese imposed maritime exclusion zone, fishing boats being sunk, a Chinese naval vessel being sunk as well, and an aircraft carrying CNN reporters being shot down. In response to these events, the Security Council resumed deliberations on the crisis. During the plenary session, participants expressed their regret that the situation had worsened and they put forth several possible responses. The option which appeared to garner the most support was a Vietnamese/Filipino recommendation that the naval forces of all parties withdraw from the area to be replaced by an international maritime peacekeeping force which would remain in place until the parties could negotiate a peaceful resolution. Players then adjourned to consider the matter informally.

During caucus deliberations, players discussed what types of leverage the international community might exert should China veto a UN-sponsored response to the crisis. Some players recommended an oil embargo and others recommended making an end run by adopting a "United for Peace Resolution."⁵ Such discussions made some players uncomfortable because they felt that any actions which caused China to feel isolated would be ill-conceived and dangerous. As deliberations continued, it became clear that China *would* veto any resolution regardless of how weakly it was worded believing it would threaten its interests. Nevertheless, some felt that China's position had become too rigid, especially its insistence on maintaining a maritime exclusion zone in the area.⁶ During the debate leading to the vote, the US asked whether China would accept US and Russian naval assistance in supervising the safe passage of ships through the area. China responded that it would consider such an arrangement only *after* it had restored stability to the area.

The draft resolution which emerged from the caucuses was sponsored primarily by Russia, India and Brazil. The resolution confirmed the Security Council's earlier resolution and called on all parties to remove their military forces from the area (including the dismantlement of new installations), demanded the lifting of all barriers to free passage, and asked that all exploitation of resources cease until a satisfactory solution could be negotiated.

⁵ The Uniting for Peace Resolution allows issues which are not seized by the Security Council to be discussed by the General Assembly. Resolutions passed by the General Assembly can only recommend action and cannot, therefore, be vetoed (a power which can only be exercised by the Permanent Five in the Security Council).

⁶ Game control requested the Chinese representative to assume a hard-line position so that the diplomatic limits of this scenario could be tested.

Despite the careful crafting of this resolution, China vetoed it (the vote being 20-1). China's insistence on maintaining the maritime exclusion zone was the primary source of disagreement. China insisted maintaining the zone was a matter of national security while others insisted it was a violation of international law. Following the vote, the President of the Council (the distinguished delegate from Zimbabwe) declared that the Council was no longer seized with the issue. This decision meant that the General Assembly could then take up the matter.

At this point in the game players adjourned to consider the benefits of adopting a "Uniting for Peace" resolution. A draft resolution was later presented for discussion in plenary session. Unlike previous resolutions which were considered without alteration, to this one participants vigorously offered changes and amendments. The debate was so lively that the resolution had to be discussed paragraph by paragraph with each being voted on separately. The first two paragraphs, which expressed the Security Council's regret that tensions had increased and that forces and restrictions to navigation had yet to be removed, were easily adopted. The most contentious of these paragraphs was the third, which called for, among other things, the establishment of an international naval presence.

Under the first version, the Assembly recommended using "all necessary means" to keep international shipping lanes open. In addition, it recommended an oil embargo against China, and requested the General Council of the World Trade Organization to consider suspending China's membership. This version was defeated after much debate. As the game neared its end, an alternative version was offered and adopted which simply stated that "the General Assembly authorizes the establishment of a multinational naval presence in the South China Sea." Adoption of the final paragraph benefited from some ambiguity of language. The western caucus believed they voted to deploy a substantial naval force capable of confronting China while the non-aligned group thought they had authorized more of a lightly-armed maritime observer force.

The representative from the UN pointed out that the final version was, in fact, simply a rephrasing (although a clever one) of the original draft and provided a blank check to any nation desiring to deploy a naval force to the South China Sea. Even those who believed the resolution's language called for a traditional peacekeeping observer force eventually had to admit that this interpretation was probably correct. Under the well-known, but unstated, rules by which traditional peacekeeping operations are governed, the consent of all parties is required before forces are deployed. In this case, China opposed the resolution. With continued disagreement as to whether the resolution authorized peace enforcement, game play had to end.

Finally, the game specifically sought to investigate the consequences of China's remaining intransigent in the assertion of its claims to much-needed oil reserves. Had the China player been allowed to be more accommodating—game controllers encouraged him to take a hard line—it is highly probable that the non-aligned states from outside the region would have

softened their position. They did not wish to alienate China and were eager to accommodate if an opening could have been found.

GENERAL TRENDS

• Regional Approaches To Crises

As in games past, players stressed that regions are diverse, not monolithic, and no single approach or policy can adequately deal with this diversity. Thus, during the game, each situation was regarded as idiosyncratic and deserving of special attention. Participants also reiterated their preference for having localized problems solved using regional organizations (such as ASEAN, the OAU or Arab League). Support for *regional action* came primarily from two sources: countries from outside the region whose national interests were not directly affected ("It's their problem, let them handle it"); and, countries whose historical experiences made intervention by foreign forces, especially western, particularly distasteful.

Those who supported *international action* also came from two principal camps: extraregional countries whose interests are directly affected by regional strife (i.e., those who might otherwise have to act unilaterally); and, less powerful states faced with a challenge from a powerful state within their region. Less powerful states believed they benefited by having their conflicts in the spotlight of public opinion, particularly if principle were clearly on their side. That is, they felt less vulnerable knowing the world was watching. In the South China Sea crisis, for example, the Filipino representative specifically sought to have it recognized as an international (vice regional) emergency for that very reason. Global action was widely resisted, however, when resolutions went beyond support of principles to actual authorization of force.

An interesting twist introduced in this game was that few countries were willing to seek remedies beyond those acceptable to states in the region. As one player put it, "There is no reason to be more papal than the Pope." If regional players were willing to accept weak resolutions, then weak resolutions were passed (even though some states expressed grave misgivings about the resolutions as passed).

• Sovereignty And Non-Interference

During the first two International Games, the sovereignty of states as the inviolable basis of international relationships figured prominently in all discussions. It was first raised during this game by the ambassador from the United States who was perplexed that it had yet to be mentioned. Once raised, however, the passion provoked by this issue became immediately evident. Perhaps the most telling comment on this subject came from the India player. He acknowledged that the world probably had accepted that sovereignty was no longer inviolable with regards to human rights, but stressed that the principles of sovereignty and non-interference

must remain the basic principle of international relations. In other words, egregious violators of human rights can no longer hide behind the shield of sovereignty.

• Double Standards For Great Powers

It became dramatically evident during the course of the game that players were unwilling to challenge directly the actions of a powerful state like China, even when the decision to act would have been easily made had a less powerful nation attempted something similar. States were reluctant, some quite strongly, to take any action which would isolate China. Russia openly declared its unwillingness to risk a breakdown in its long-term relationship with China by supporting any resolution challenging China's national interests. This clash of principles versus reality threaded its way through the entire game. States did not like to see China impose its will on small states, yet they remained unwilling to confront China.

The Indian representative argued the reverse side of the double standard issue during the debate concerning intervention in Algeria. He averred that in the South China Sea case the west opposed a China trying to achieve stability and security on its own terms. Yet, he continued, the west tried to do the same thing in Algeria (i.e., dictate the terms of how to achieve stability). Both the argument and the comparison were dismissed by the west.

• Relative Shifts In International Power

Two of the most striking trends of past International Games were the extent to which Russia was marginalized and China courted. China's status as an emerging international power (militarily, politically and economically) has been consistently evident each year. On the other hand, players have had difficulty knowing how to deal with Russia. Although economically weak, Russia maintains a large nuclear arsenal and possesses a Security Council veto. To some extent, the Russian emerged as a stronger player in this year's game.

During past games, Russia's representative was neither invited to join caucuses nor sought for his or her position. This year the Russian representative was determined that Russia's position be heard and he started the game by joining the western caucus. As the game proceeded, however, he was more often drawn into the non-aligned group. To some extent this latter association was natural since both Russia and many of the others members of the non-aligned caucus resented the post-Cold War attitude of the "triumphal west." Player interest in Russia's future was generally high during the game possibly because, in the real world, the first round of presidential elections were completed just prior to the game.

One other reason that the Russian envoy emerged as more active this year was that both he and the Chinese representative were more routinely consulted by the other original permanent members of the Security Council in an attempt to reach a Permanent Five position. This was difficult, however, during the South China Sea Scenario since China was a party to the crisis and

Russia refused to confront it. This last fact made the South China Sea scenario particularly difficult for the players to deal with both across the board and within the context of the Permanent Five.

Even though Japan, Germany, Brazil and India had, for game purposes, been given permanent seats on the Council, no Permanent Nine group developed. When questioned about whether this would have changed had they been given a veto along with a permanent seat, the UK representative said it was probably more a reflection of habit. He argued that if states were given permanent seats, with or without veto authority, a pattern of consultation would develop over time that would dramatically increase those countries influence in the world. The Indian delegate, nevertheless, expressed skepticism on this point.

- **US Leadership**

Discussions on the first day and the game itself showed that, while the influence of the United States may decrease relative to that of China and other states, it will continue to be expected to play a leadership role on issues of global significance. The game also demonstrated that states will neither wait for the US nor generally take the first step to approach it. In particular, vis-à-vis all the original Permanent Members (except for China), some extended non-aligned states acted more as parties to be courted than as supplicants for support.

- **Public Opinion**

Several participants noted that their support for international action would be significantly influenced by domestic public opinion. In the Algerian scenario in particular, this could have become a significant problem for Arab diplomats concerned with joining any western coalition aiming to "reprimand" an Islamic Arab state. Thus they preferred a regional (that is, intra-Arab) solution.

- **Financial Cost Of International Action**

The issue of who pays for peacekeeping, enforcement and humanitarian activities was raised by several members of the extended non-aligned caucus with regards both the South China Sea and Algerian scenarios. In the Algerian crisis, the Cameroon player, who preferred that a regional organization like the OAU deal with the problem, pointed out that the OAU was broke.

The representative from Cameroon, supported by her Brazilian colleague, also pointed out another traditional concern of developing nations—money spent for peacekeeping or peace enforcement inevitably reduces money available for development projects. She stressed the need for early action in crisis response, arguing that nipping a crisis in the bud is always cheaper than dealing with it after it has escalated.

CONCLUSIONS

As pointed out at the beginning of this report, one of the objectives of International Game '96 was to examine the benefits and challenges of working multilaterally. There is almost universal acceptance that the United Nations remains the one body that can bestow global legitimacy for multilateral action. But as this game pointed out, gaining consensus for anything but the most anodyne of actions is problematic. During the Algerian scenario, for example, the players found themselves arguing "principles" while the situation rapidly worsened. This demonstrated the depth of disagreement about how crises should be resolved. The devil is always in the details and the details only emerge when principles have to be backed up by action. As expected, game controllers had to force participants, through manipulation of the scenarios, to move beyond rhetoric to action. Contrary to this being a pejorative observation about participant play, it demonstrates how difficult it is for actual UN envoys to deal with the everyday challenges they face.

The most obvious conclusion that can be drawn from the game is that China has or will emerge as an international power. For the most part, others were deferential to China's desires and sought to engage it in multinational negotiations. Only when China insisted on maintaining a position clearly unacceptable to the rest of the players were actions taken to isolate it. When that happened, the non-aligned group expected the western powers to step in and confront China, but preferred such confrontation to be diplomatic or economic rather than military.

The Chinese envoy demonstrated that one of the advantages nation states have over international organizations is the ability to take the long view. Generally, the international community is pressed into action at the last moment and expected to effect immediate results. By taking the long view, China believed it could resist international proposals and simply wait until international attention was drawn elsewhere before continuing to pursue its original aims. The Chinese representative believed that short-term losses could easily be sustained if they had little or no affect on long-term aims. To some extent, China's neighbors (particularly Russia, Japan and South Korea) took this view with regards to their relationship with China. They were very reluctant to support any action which would isolate China. The Russian delegate specifically stated that he could not support any action which would challenge China's national interests.

During the game there was a tendency for players to resist supporting any resolution which singled out a state for censure. Participants believed that the chances for resolving a crisis improved if the UN appeared to be impartial. Thus, they were much more willing to adopt resolutions supporting accepted international principles or which were so feeble that they could not possibly offend (or affect) anyone. For example, players unanimously expressed their opposition to the maritime exclusion zone posed in the China scenario, but stopped short of authorizing actions to forcibly remove it. As one delegate put it, they were looking for "the ideal non-committal resolution." The non-aligned group insisted that they were not non-committal but

preferred acting incrementally. They were simply unwilling to leap from no action to enforcement action on the assumption that intermediate steps had no chance of success.

There also appears to be a growing sentiment that the relative utility of military force for dealing with international crises is on the wane. This may prove to be a self-fulfilling prophecy but to date does not reflect reality. When force must be used, most players expressed a strong preference for regional forces. Members of the western caucus also preferred local solutions, but if noted that if they were required to participate, they wanted quick, forceful action that had some assurance of being effective. They saw little benefit to the incremental approach preferred by most of the extended non-aligned group.

Several players lamented the fact that the international community is not doing enough to prevent crises and as a result it continues to react (and then only when conditions get very bad). While many agreed that prevention is better than cure, they insisted there are simply not enough resources available to prevent all problems and few means of prioritizing challenges beyond national interests. Thus, the international community is likely to continue to respond on an *ad hoc* basis as crises develop. Which humanitarian emergencies receive the most attention (and therefore money) will depend partly upon the media.

There has been much discussion since the end of the Cold War about how the international community will reorganize itself. When it comes to international crisis response, this game indicates that four groups will likely emerge. The first group identified in this game was the western caucus. Although they will be reluctant to act, when do they will be the group pressing for strong international action. The second and third groups come from the extended non-aligned group. One of these could be called the loyal opposition. They will support action but prefer different methods (more regional, pacific and incremental) than those proposed by the west. They will also decry the west's tendency to deal with the symptoms rather than the causes of humanitarian crises. The third group will include both victim and intimately-involved states. This group will generally place relief ahead of principle. That is, even though they might generally support the views and methods of the non-aligned group, they will support any group willing to offer them succor. The final group consists of the targets of action, those considered responsible for causing the crisis at hand. Unlike the blocs which dominated the Cold War era, the cohesiveness of these new groups is very loose. For example, Russia was able to move easily between the western and non-aligned caucuses throughout the game.

In the game, there were some real differences between the groups. The western and non-aligned groups lamented the fact that the other had no real appreciation for what they were trying to do or what issues really mattered to them. Thus, the spokespersons for the two groups often found themselves "talking past" each other. For example, when during the wrap-up briefing the west was presented with the non-aligned groups complaint that they had not been listened to, the west responded that they had not been heard either. The difference was that the non-aligned states wanted to be heard so that an accommodation could be worked out while the west wanted

to be heard so that others knew what they were going to do. In other words, states in the non-aligned group were looked upon as swing members but it seemed that the west was only willing to accept non-aligned states on the west's terms.

Another difference was that the non-aligned group truly resented the post-Cold War "to the victor the spoils" attitude of the "triumphal west." This was one reason that Russia found itself more comfortable in the non-aligned caucus. Players from less powerful states understand, if resent, the reasons great powers are treated and able to act differently. Nevertheless they desire to be treated as partners, if not equals, when conducting international relations. One way of achieving international egalitarianism is to increase strength through numbers. With China and Russia often joining the non-aligned group, it became the game's largest caucus and proved to be an effective foil to the west. It also provided less powerful states with a much-valued venue for airing their views. Unlike past years, participants preferred conducting their business during informal caucus rather than in plenary sessions. They believed that informal discussions were the best method available to overcome misunderstanding and miscommunication.

One of the hallmarks of the future will be that great and lesser powers will share many of the same goals. Developed and developing states will both have a tremendous stake in assuring their resources are protected. Resources are likely to replace ideology as the primary source of conflict in the future (particularly, water, fish and oil).

During the final session of the game, several other dimensions of conflict were discussed. The first was the fact that the game never really addressed the issue of weapons of mass destruction, in particular, what affect nuclear weapons might have on future crisis if one of the belligerents possesses them. There was a discussion of Samuel Huntington's proposition that the future will be defined by a clash of civilizations.⁷ As regards the Islamic "civilization," the International Game series has not demonstrated that such clashes are inevitable even though there has been an Algerian scenario played each year involving religious extremists.

On numerous occasions participants expressed their conviction that certain universal principles exist which provide the fundamental foundation for personal, institutional and international relations; foremost among them are a strict regard for human rights and democracy. But principles seemed to bump continually against the wall of reality throughout the game. As noted in the South China Sea scenario, most states were angered at China's intransigence, but not angry enough to challenge China. In the Algerian scenario, one of the conundrums faced by participants was the fact that the crisis began when an extreme, but legitimately-elected, government was denied the opportunity to take power. When during the game a decision was finally made to take action, the west preferred a quick, forceful response while the extended non-aligned caucus pressed for a more incremental approach.

⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49.

A question raised by the Tunisian delegate, but left unanswered due to time constraints, was whether western democracies believe their governmental ideals are incompatible with those of Islamic administrations? In other words, is there a single acceptable model of democracy or is there room for numerous models under the democratic umbrella? Extremism in any form appears to be an anathema to the international community. Nations, for the most, understand that rational and principled behavior form the basis of understanding and cooperation. Representatives from countries whose primary faith is Islam, however, fear that continued caricaturization of all Muslims as extremist and belligerent will make Huntington's prediction a self-fulfilling prophecy. For those who reject Huntington's theory, and their number is legion, the International Game series should provide a welcome ray of hope. The one consistent position that participants have taken throughout the games is that behavior, not belief, is the standard by which government action must be judged.

Finally, the Russian participant pointed out one significant factor which will continue to limit international engagement in the future—no global policy emerged following the end of the Cold War. While he noted that the lack of Cold War rhetoric allowed for less heated discussion, without a guiding strategy, such as containment, the international community finds it much more difficult to agree on when and where it should act. State interests are more narrowly defined and the calculus used to determine when and where the international community should act appears to include a much smaller set of scenarios.

ANNEX A - PARTICIPANTS

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AMERICAS

United States	PETERS, Laura Lee	International Affairs Advisor, Naval War College; former ambassador to Sierra Leone
Colombia	DUARTE, Juan Carlos	Harvard IID; former Governor Santander State, Colombia
Chile	GAETE, Rodrigo	Counselor of the Chilean Embassy's Political Department, Washington, DC
Brazil	PORTO, Alexandre	Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of Brazil to the UN

EUROPE

United Kingdom	SAWERS, John	Harvard CFIA; Diplomat; Counselor, British Embassy, Washington, DC
France	LOUDIN, Yves	Harvard CFIA; Diplomat; former Counselor of the French Embassy, Rabat
Germany	LIBAL, Michael	Harvard CFIA; Diplomat; former Head, Southeast European Desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bonn
Italy	BIN, Alberto	Deputy Director, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta
Finland	HIMANEN, Hannu	Harvard CFIA; Diplomat; Finnish Ambassador to Indonesia

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Ghana	AMISSAH-ARTHUR, Jabesh	Harvard IID; Director, Management Information Systems Dept., Volta River Authority, Ghana
Cameroon	MUNDI, Ama Agnes	Harvard CFIA; Chief of the Division of Administration and Finance, University of Yaounde II; former NGO Official
Zimbabwe	SAMKANGE, Stanlake	UN Department of Political Affairs, Desk Officer for Liberia and Nigeria

NORTH AFRICA/MIDDLE EAST

Egypt	EL-HADIDI, Alaa	Harvard CFIA; Diplomat; Counselor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo
Jordan	AL FOUL, Haitham Abu	Graduate, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta; Attaché, Political Department., Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jordan
Tunisia	HAFSI, Mohammed Salim	Graduate, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta; Deputy Secretary General, Constitutional Democratic Youth Bureau, Tunis-Medina

ASIA		
China	LI, Nan	Visiting Professor, Eastern Kentucky University; formerly taught at University of Massachusetts at Amherst, specializing in Foreign Policy, Asian Politics, American Foreign Policy
India	PRASAD, Alok	Harvard CFIA; Diplomat; former Consul General, Indian Consulate, Frankfurt
Japan	TASE, Yasuhiro	Harvard CFIA; Journalist; Senior Editorial Writer, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Tokyo
Philippines	ABAYA, Annabelle	Harvard IID; Radio/ television anchor with DZNN Radio Veritas/RPN Channel 9; former Presidential Spokesperson in the Ramos administration
South Korea	PARK, Sang-Ki	Harvard CFIA; Diplomat; former Counselor, Korean Mission to the European Union, Brussels
RUSSIA		
Russia	ZUBOK, Vladislav M.	Research Fellow, National Security Archive; former consultant for the Watson Institute, Brown University

ANNEX B - SCENARIOS

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SCENARIOS

This annex provides a brief overview of the scenarios played during International Game '96. Again it must be stressed that the scenarios were illustrative only and intended to provoke discussion rather than predict future events.

China (South China Sea)⁸

Background

The year is 2006. The death of China's preeminent leader, Deng Xiaoping, led to a short period of transition in Beijing. The post-Deng political transition went smoothly, with a President/Premier "team" firmly in charge although not wildly popular. No serious contender emerged or popular unrest developed during the transition, in great part due to the country's overall improvement in living standards. The leadership team's outstanding "debts" with the military are being repaid through generous budgetary allocations.

The team also secured its position through political concessions: a relaxation of rigorous political controls, competitive local elections, strengthened respect for legal rights and an independent judiciary, expanded scope for private economic activities, and favored tax treatment of the prosperous eastern provinces. The Party allows no formal opposition but has permitted the National People's Congress to become a lively forum for political debate and exercise greater power in the decisionmaking process. The Party's ideological foundation has crumbled; its mandate to rule is based on performance, particularly its economic record.

To mobilize a largely apathetic citizenry, China's leadership resorts increasingly to nationalistic themes: restoring China's historical preeminence in the region, securing respect for China's economic and military might, resisting western pressure to accept a "non-Asian" code of conduct. All this resonates with the Chinese public. Training, equipment, and force modernization has transformed the military into a highly effective force. China's economic success enhanced her ability to support this major build-up of its armed forces, in particular its Navy in the South China Sea.

The evolution of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has developed from a core of Southeast Asian states and now includes all ten of the area's nations. ASEAN's military side is developing slowly, but does not yet constitute a defense alliance. Overlapping claims in the South China Sea/Spratly Islands are seen as a serious potential source of conflict. ASEAN claimants regard them as a litmus test of China's intentions.

⁸ This section was drawn from the written scenario provided to the players. Its principal architect was CDR Rick Gallagher, USN.

China's relations with neighboring states are good, mostly because the latter are willing to overlook the political risks of a stronger China in order to exploit the increased trade and investment opportunities good relations make available. China is also seen as a useful counterbalance to Japan, Korea, and India — all of which are playing a more active commercial and military role in the region.

China's relationship with the United States has remained stable over the last 10 years—general cooperation pockmarked by periods of tensions over intellectual property and human rights, and trade. In addition, there is tension over the growing size of the Chinese economy and the competition from others like ASEAN, Europe, and Korea to get access to it. The United States is actively pursuing a policy of “constraintment.”⁹

Forces within China are steadily eroding the Party's monopoly on political activity and the government's ability to effectively manage the process of modernization. The wealthy southeastern provinces are increasingly alienated from both the hinterland and Beijing. They are sympathetic to calls for a stronger China but are unwilling to risk any military confrontation which would jeopardize important sea lines of communication, upset financial markets, divert spending into the military, or undermine trade and investment relationships.

While concerned about China's growing capability to project force in the South China Sea, few states have viewed this as an imminent threat to their economic interests as long as trade lanes are left undisturbed and negotiations remain underway for joint development of natural resources. Because of the economic prosperity of the Southeast Asian region, demand for oil has risen dramatically. Any movement by China to occupy disputed islands (particularly, the Paracels and Spratlys) for military or resource exploitation purposes, would be vigorously opposed.

China's oil crisis

In 2006 China is faced with declining oil reserves, flagging output and rising domestic consumption. China knows it must make significant new oil discoveries if it is to avoid becoming heavily dependent on imports and maintain the momentum of its economic growth. Current foreign oil imports are 25 percent of China's domestic consumption. In the past, China's major Middle East suppliers have been willing to barter arms for oil. These countries now have

⁹ The goal of the “constraintment” policy, established in 1998, is to integrate China into the international system. Its goal is to signal to the Chinese leadership “that the outside world has interests that will be defended by means of incentives for good behavior, deterrence of bad behavior, and punishment when deterrence fails.” For the intellectual underpinnings of the policy of constraintment, see Gerald Segal, “East Asia and the ‘Constraintment’ of China,” *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 107-135.

full arsenals and seek more advanced technology than China can offer and are seeking cash for oil. This requirement is stressing China's hard currency reserves.

The gap between China's energy needs and domestic production has steadily widened since 1995. Oil exploration has been disappointing. Onshore oil exploration development in the Tarim Basin in the northwest of the country, even after five years of research, remains the largest underexplored oil reserve in the world. The uncommonly harsh terrain has caused major setbacks for state-owned companies attempting to exploit it. These setbacks have persuaded the Chinese leadership to pursue offshore alternatives in the South China Sea. The size of potential oil deposits surrounding the Spratly archipelago is believed by China to be vast. Previous exploration efforts in 1995 and 1998, in the South China Sea were expensive but disappointing. As a consequence, the Chinese have decided to pursue joint venture exploration with foreign oil companies on the basis of production-sharing contracts.

Political analysts see China's actions as more of a way to guarantee access to oil than as territorial aggression. From the perspective of China's neighbor's, however, the results are the same regardless of China's motives. China's need for oil and its sovereignty claim over islands in the South China Sea are major causes for concern among the other five claimants of the Spratly archipelago (Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan). The Paracels are potential stepping stones to the Spratlys, which lie 560km to the south. In 1997, China built an operational airfield on Woody Island and conducted naval training exercises from the Paracels group.

The Spratlys are a valuable strategic prize, not only because of their potential oil and gas deposits, but because they lie along major shipping lanes and fishing grounds. Should China succeed in achieving its sovereignty aims over this portion of the South China Sea, it could claim a 12-mile territorial sea around the islands, rocks and reefs, and, possibly, a 200-mile exclusive economic zone around some of the major islands. The area covers or is close to the principal east-west access route between the Middle East and Japan. This means that China could dominate the maritime heart of Southeast Asia. This prospect is disturbing, not only for Japan and those states that dispute China's territorial and maritime claims, but also for other Asian powers such as India, Thailand and Indonesia.

With the exception of Burma, Thailand, Singapore, and Cambodia, Spratly Island claimants, including China, are participants in the ASEAN Regional Forum, which meets periodically to permit members to air their concerns about political and security issues. But the forum has not been able to get at the heart of the dispute due to China's refusal to discuss the problem. China refuses any serious efforts at multilateral negotiations, preferring to discuss issues on a bilateral basis. China has adamantly refused to discuss its territorial claims but has indicated its willingness to consider joint exploitation of petroleum resources in the Spratlys. The risk of military conflict under these conditions is high. China's Defense Minister reiterated that China will give naval protection to private exploration companies. China has declared itself as

determined as the United States to defend its access to oil supplies. Furthermore, China has stated that it will not be intimidated from using force to defend its rights of access.

China has attempted to influence Japan, the United States, India, Burma, Singapore and Malaysia to remain neutral on the issue. Statements by the United States, Japan and the ASEAN countries were critical of China's efforts to extend her power unilaterally in the Western Pacific. There was great concern about the rising level of hostilities. When the United States expressed concern about the potential for interference with freedom of navigation on international shipping routes, China announced it would not interfere with shipping through recognized international shipping lanes, but declared that if shots are exchanged, it cannot guarantee the safety of international shipping.

Situation Faced by Players

In April 2006, in reaction to heightening tensions, China's South China Sea Fleet steams to the Spratlys, supported by Chinese SU-27 Flankers and MIG-31 fighters operating from Woody Island in the Paracels. Chinese forces occupy additional reefs and islands, and begin to build military support facilities. In May, a coalition consisting of the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Brunei, and reluctantly Thailand, request authorization from the United Nations to enforce freedom of navigation and the right to exploit resources in the area. Further, the Philippines requests that the Security Council authorize the coalition and other willing states to develop enforcement measures.

North Africa¹⁰

Background

By 2005 the European Union's (EU) initiative of the late 1990s, aimed at creating a region of peace, security, and prosperity in the southern Mediterranean, has been partially successful. The establishment of a limited Mediterranean free trade zone, and greater political and security cooperation between the EU and the North African and Middle Eastern littoral states, has increased the standard of living and stability in several nations which have managed to keep population growth behind the growth in gross national product. This wave of prosperity has, however, generally bypassed Algeria.

Although the National Liberation Front (FLN) won convincingly during the 1995 presidential elections, it failed to fulfill many of the economic and political reforms promised during the campaign. The president was slow to open up the political process, was unable to peacefully engage moderate political opposition groups, and failed to make the structural changes to the Algerian economy required to attract significant foreign investments.

¹⁰ This scenario was drafted by Mr. John Bird and Professor Henry Kamradt.

Additionally, the large amount of aid anticipated from the EU did not materialize, due in part to the EU's lack of confidence in the Algerian government and partially because the EU's focus shifted from the Mediterranean to other parts of Europe in the late 1990s.

Despite declining social and economic conditions, the FLN (headed by a new President) maintained a slim majority in parliament following elections in 2000. This was largely thanks to continued strong backing from the military and a boycott of the general election by a number of opposition parties which resulted in very low voter turnout. However, the President was unable to stop a steady decline of the Algerian economy or the increasing isolation of the government. By 2005 the economy deteriorated to such an extent that increasing numbers were living a subsistence existence and durable goods were priced beyond the reach of all but the wealthiest Algerians.

Political, social, and economic discontent led to a resurgence in the popularity of, and membership in, extremist factions such as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). Over the past few years, hundreds of Algerian intellectuals, government officials, journalists, military officers, and foreigners have been assassinated. The increasingly authoritarian measures used by the FLN to maintain its grip on power and control civil unrest resulted in even greater alienation of the populace, and the increased isolation of Algeria from the international community. One of the most significant repercussions from the downward social and economic spiral was the development of a philosophical rift in the military, traditionally strong proponents of the secular rule of the FLN and its hard-line policies against extremists. While the majority of older officers were inclined to support the FLN at all costs, many junior officers and non-commissioned personnel harbored a growing frustration with the total failure of FLN policies and developed deep sympathies with the extremist opposition.

Late in 2005, anticipating yet another opposition boycott of the general election resulting in low voter turnout, and expecting to be fully supported by the military in the event of a miscalculation, the President decided to gamble and allowed the scheduled parliamentary elections to proceed. Unfortunately, opposition party members turned out in record numbers resulting in victory for FIS candidates and related extremist groups. Faced with these unpalatable results, the President, citing voting "irregularities" and concerns about "internal stability," nullified the election, instituted an interim military government with himself at its head, and suspended all constitutional rights and personal liberties. Within hours of the election nullification, massive rioting broke out and quickly escalated into full-scale revolt. As in the past, the armed forces were called out to restore order.

Rather than fully support another crackdown against their own citizens, some of the more idealistic young officers, as well as the bulk of enlisted personnel, defected to support the newly elected government. With the military fractured and fighting on both sides, the FLN was unable to maintain control. After several days of intense combat, pro-extremist factions had seized all key portions of the government and either subdued or co-opted the remaining police and military

forces. The FLN government, along with many of their key supporters, fled into exile in southern Europe, Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya. Thousands of refugees, including ex-members of the Algerian armed forces, established themselves in camps in bordering African states, especially Morocco.

Within a few days of the end of the fighting, the FIS, backed by rebel units of the army, declared itself to be the head of the "Islamic Peoples Republic of Algeria" and began to restructure the remaining police and military into a loyal internal security apparatus. The FIS quickly imposed its own interpretation of Islamic law and announced an intense program of Islamization, Arabization, and nationalization of all foreign owned assets.

Situation Faced by Players

Shortly after the FIS takeover, police, security forces, and government inspired vigilante groups began a bloody reprisal campaign against Algerians suspected to have been connected with the deposed FLN government. Hundreds of ex-government and military officials were jailed and executed. Additionally, anyone deemed "insufficiently Arab" was subject to harassment and attack. Deaths among non-Arabs increased alarmingly and the FIS government had neither the resources, nor perhaps the desire, to prevent reprisals from escalating to ethnic cleansing.

For the most part, foreign nationals have been allowed to leave Algeria unmolested. The United States conducted a pair of successful operations to evacuate virtually all Americans, as well as many others. Despite the situation, several thousand foreign nationals (mostly French citizens with Algerian spouses or strong business ties) have elected to remain in Algeria.

As the situation now stands, the number of Algerian refugees streaming towards the borders of neighboring states is growing geometrically. The FIS is making little effort to prevent them from leaving. In fact, the terror campaign, which is still underway, seems intended to encourage FIS opponents and potential troublemakers to leave. Tens of thousands of refugees are choking the camps in Morocco and Tunisia and thousands more have attempted to escape via the Mediterranean to southern Europe. The potential exists for hundreds of thousands more, mostly Berbers and French-speaking Algerians, to join the exodus. Hundreds of Algerian small craft are being prepared for sea and there are indications that friends and relatives living in Spain, France, and Italy are organizing a boat lift to evacuate refugees to southern Europe.

Both Morocco and Tunisia have requested humanitarian assistance from the UN, the OAU, and the EU to help feed and house the refugees. Morocco has also requested UN help in stemming the flow of new refugees and the resettlement of those already in the country. The Moroccan government is particularly concerned that extremist agitators or Algerian paramilitary forces will slip into the country with the steady stream of refugees. It has requested that sufficient UN observers be placed on the border to prevent the flow of arms and terrorism in either

direction. Finally, Morocco has called on the UN to direct Algeria to stop forcing people out of the country.